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Calling in the lawyers is becoming a frequent response to the challenges of Brexit. While court actions on matters
of constitutional law are well known, there is another, less publicised, avenue of legal resistance. Let us consider
the case of foreign financial firms that established themselves in the City of London to take advantage of the UK’s
much lauded position as the centre of European finance. The government’s decision to interpret the Referendum
result as a mandate to leave the single market heralds a fundamental change to the regulatory environment
under which foreign firms had established in the UK.
Foreign owned financials could seek legal redress arguing that the changes brought about by Brexit (from the
point of exit onwards) will violate legitimate expectations protected by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) the UK
has signed with their country of origin. BITs offer rights, protections and standards to investors that are in some
ways superior to those enjoyed under domestic, or even EU law. These protections will survive Brexit as they are
creatures of international law, not linked to the UK’s EU membership. They are also enforced by an international
system of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) tribunals. Treaties promise to create favourable conditions
for investment, reciprocally. These conditions include the fair and equitable treatment of businesses investing in
the UK, freedom from discrimination, full protection and security.
For example, assuming a hard Brexit takes place in 2019, a Mexican-owned bank operating out of the City will
be able to sue the UK in an investment tribunal for the loss of passporting rights on the strength of the UK-Mexico
BIT of 2006. There is good precedent for suing western governments for radical changes in regulatory regimes.
Spain is an example. Almost every foreign investor in the energy field has sued Spain for recent changes in
incentives structures for renewable energy generation. The Spanish government had aimed to make the country
a leader in clean energy. Spain promised a stable and welcoming environment to clean energy generators,
which, it is claimed, acted as a guarantee of their successful commercial enterprise and financial viability. One
could say the same about the UK and financial services.
Government promises can only be violated at a price. Relying on precedents found in investment arbitration
awards against Mexico, Equador and Turkey, a claimant could argue that the UK will be in violation of treaty
standards post Brexit. It all depends on whether tribunals will agree to protect the investors’ legitimate
expectations. In cases against Argentina, for example, it was held that expectations must be based on conditions
offered by or prevailing in the host State at the time the original investment is made. To return to our Mexican
bank example, it could be claimed that the loss of passporting represents a fundamental breach of
representations made by the UK at the time of establishment. Could the UK counter that its policy volte-face does
not constitute a violation of treaty standards, but was a result of an internal democratic process? Defending
regulatory changes on the basis of political decisions has had a poor record of success in investment tribunals.
The whole point of commitments in BITs is to protect investors from arbitrary policy changes. Not even
arguments based upon economic emergencies seem to impress tribunals as shown in cases against Argentina.
Claimants would argue moreover that the UK’s refusal to guarantee the payment of compensation for the costs
arising from the loss of passporting rights, necessarily renders the UK’s actions unlawful.
Could someone actually win such a case? While early decisions on the Spanish cases did not favour investors,
claimants scored a notable win in May 2017. Actually, the brilliance of this method of leveraging Brexit is that one
does not have to win. The precedent of Argentina is indicative of how aggrieved investors may use ISDS
tribunals in the Brexit context. Tribunals tend to hear disputes even when the alleged violations have led to
losses stemming from measures falling short of outright expropriations or shut downs. It is crucial to emphasise
here that these actions will not be coming to tribunals necessarily because investors expect to win substantial
amounts in compensation. Rather, they will be surfacing at increasing volumes because of the political leverage
they create. Countries like Greece, Spain, and Argentina have already experienced the consequences. Having
investors complaining in tribunals is not conducive to market stability. Investors will be hoping to force
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settlements. Theresa May has already shown willingness to compromise by making promises to certain
members of the auto industry to shield them from the consequences of Brexit. Why shouldn’t financials get the
same treatment, especially if they can wave an ISDS stick at the government? The consequence of all this? The
Brexit bill is about to become a lot bigger.
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